Citation
Mallatt, Jon and Feinberg, Todd E. (2020) Sentience in evolutionary context. Animal Sentience 29(14)
Thread
Irina Mikhalevich and Russell Powell, Minds without spines: Evolutionarily inclusive animal ethics
Abstract
We appreciate the goals of Mikhalevich & Powell (M&P) and largely agree with their conclusions but we differ on some of their definitions and terms. Affects (emotional feelings) should be part of sentience. Although the evidence presented for insect sentience is strong, we list some of the counterevidence that should be considered. Our own research supports M&P’s choice of arthropods, cephalopods, and vertebrates as the only sentient organisms with moral status.
DOI
10.51291/2377-7478.1599
Included in
Cognition and Perception Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Evolution Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons, Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecology Commons, Zoology Commons