Citation
Key, Brian and Brown, Deborah (2020) Minds, morality and midgies. Animal Sentience 29(24)
Thread
Irina Mikhalevich and Russell Powell, Minds without spines: Evolutionarily inclusive animal ethics
Abstract
Mikhalevich & Powell argue that the exclusion of the vast majority of arthropods from moral standing is unwarranted, particularly given the purported evidence for cognition and sentience in these organisms. The implied association between consciousness and moral standing is questionable and their assumption that rich forms of cognition and flexible behavior are dependent on phenomenal consciousness needs to be reconsidered in light of current neuroscientific evidence. We conclude by proposing a neural algorithmic approach for deciphering whether organisms are capable of subjective experience.
DOI
10.51291/2377-7478.1619
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Cognitive Neuroscience Commons, Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, Evolution Commons, Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons, Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecology Commons, Zoology Commons