Citation
Key, Brian and Brown, Deborah (2022) Lack of imagination can bias our view of animal sentience. Animal Sentience 32(26)
Thread
Andrew Crump, Heather Browning, Alex Schnell, Charlotte Burn, and Jonathan Birch, Sentience in decapod crustaceans: A general framework and review of the evidence
Abstract
How an animal reacts to a sensory stimulus is often used to assess whether that animal can experience feelings such as pain and pleasure. This behavioural path is typically complemented with reference to how a human would normally respond to and experience an analogous stimulus. Together, these approaches can lead to a “hard to imagine otherwise” argument for feelings. It is time to go beyond these qualitative assessments and to now determine whether a nervous system can execute the neural functions necessary for sentience.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
DOI
10.51291/2377-7478.1756
Included in
Cognitive Neuroscience Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons, Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons